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AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICIES
BUILD "WRITE-AWAY" AROUND FROLIC
AND DETOUR, A PERSISTENT
PROBLEM ON THE HIGHWAY
OF TORTS
WILLIAM

A.

WINESt

Historians trace the origin of the doctrine of frolic and detour
to the pronouncement of Baron Parke in 1834.1 The debate over
the wisdom and the theoretical underpinnings of the doctrine
seems to have erupted not long after the birth of the doctrine. No
less a scholar than Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., questioned
whether the doctrine was contrary to common sense.2 This doctrine continued to attract legal scholars who were still debating
the underlying policy premises as the doctrine celebrated its sesquicentennial and headed toward the second century mark.3
However, the main source of cases which test the doctrine, namely
automobile accidents, has started to decline, at least insofar as it
involves "frolic and detour" questions and thus the impact of this
doctrine may becoming minimized. 4
t William A. Wines is Professor and formerly Chairman of the Management
Department, College of Business, Boise State University, Boise, Idaho. He
received his J.D. in 1974 from the University of Michigan and his B.S.B.A. from
Northwestern (with distinction) in 1967. He is admitted to practice in both
Minnesota and Washington state. His private practice for a number of years
centered around employment law. His previous research and writing appear in
the Marquette Law Review, Arizona Law Review, The Journal of Collective
Bargainingin the Public Sector, The Labor Law Journal, and the Gonzaga Law
Review, among others.
1. Joel v. Morrison, 172 Eng. Rep. 1338 (1834). See infra note 9 and
principal quote in accompanying text.
2. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Agency, 5 HARv. L. REV. 1, 14 (1891).
3. See, e.g., Alan Q. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An
EconomicAnalysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines,
101 HARv. L. REv. 563 (1988) (in which the author attempts to explain vicarious
liability (including frolic and detour) by using Chicago School neoclassical
economic theory emphasizing efficiency and probability-style enterprise
causation). For a general critique of law and economics approach see James B.
Zimarowski et al., An InstitutionalistPerspective on Law and Economics(Chicago
Style) in the Context of United States Labor Law, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 397 (1993).
4. See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
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Automobile insurance carriers appear to be side-stepping the
uncertainty and confusion in this area by including "permissive
user" language in their policies. In part I - Liability of its "E-Z
Reader Car Policy" for Washington State, Farmers Insurance
Group carefully defines both insured and non-insured persons as
follows:
INSURED PERSON

as used in this part means:

1. You or any FAMILY MEMBER.
2. Any person using YOUR INSURED

CAR.

3. Any other person or organization with respect only to legal liability for acts or omissions of:
a. Any person covered under this part while using YOUR
INSURED CAR.

b. You or any
using any
TRAILER

FAMILY MEMBER

covered under this part while

PRIVATE PASSENGER CAR, UTILITY CAR, or UTILITY

other than YOUR INSURED

CAR

if not owned or hired

by that person or organization.
INSURED PERSON

does not mean:

1. The United States of America or any of its agencies.

2. Any person for BODILY

INJURY

or PROPERTY

DAMAGE

arising from

the operation of a vehicle by that person as an employee of the
United States Government when the provisions of the Federal
Tort Claims Act apply.
3. Any person who uses a vehicle without having sufficient reason
to believe that the use is with permission of the owner.
Thus the doctrine which was initiated by a servant's negligently
driving his master's horse cart, progressed slowly in the annals of
the law until the dawn of the age of the automobile.5
This article reviews the controversy surrounding the "frolic
and detour" doctrine, looks at the Restatement (Second) of Agency
position' on the question, and examines a standard of automobile
insurance policy containing the permissive user clause. Next, the
results of an empirical test of whether the frequency of litigation
has decreased in the "frolic and detour" area is presented. We
estimated the volume of cases filed under a West Publishing Company Key number by using the number of pages in the Decennial
Digest as a proxy for the quantity of reported cases over ten year
periods beginning in 1927 and ending in 1986. Using the Decennial Digest pages, we have attempted to gauge the amount of
5. Joel, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1338.
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 233-37 (1958) (which employs a mix
of intention and physical zone of danger tests to determine whether negligence of
servant should be imputed to the master).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss1/4
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"frolic and detour" litigation as a percentage of total agency litigation. 7 The results of the analysis suggest a relative decline in the
number of "frolic and detour" cases from the Fourth Decennial
Digest of 1927-36 to the Ninth Decennial Digest of 1977-86. 8
While this admittedly is a crude empirical measure, the results of
the analysis imply some success on the part of insurers in avoiding "frolic and detour" litigation. The analysis suggests that,
while the jurisprudential debate continues over whether and how
"frolic and detour" makes theoretical sense, the outcome may have
been rendered somewhat academic, for the doctrine may be reaching a natural end which should be so reached by all such confusing
and conflicting doctrines. 9
DISCUSSION

If the servant, being on his master's business, took a detour to call
upon a friend, the master will be responsible .... If he was going
out of his way, against his master's implied commands, when driving on his master's business, he will make his master liable; but if
at all on his
he was going on a frolic of his own, without being
10
master's business, the master will not be liable.
Thus, Baron Parke, in his charge to the jury, introduced the
"frolic and detour" test for applying respondeatsuperior to master
and servant cases involving the operation of vehicles. In that
case, the servant was to drive on a highway that bypassed the city
but instead drove the master's cart into town for his own purpose
and while there negligently collided with the plaintiff for whom
the jury returned a verdict. The case of Joel v. Morrison established a substantive defense for the employers of negligent servants, namely that of frolic. Unfortunately, the "frolic and detour"
doctrine has not acquired consistency over time; rather, it has
generated much debate and numerous conflicting decisions. Some
of the inconsistency stems from the two different approaches that
courts take in applying the defense: (1) The "intent" approach
asks why the agent was doing what he was, i.e., was it for the
7. See infra Tables 1 and 2 and Graph 5 and text accompanying notes 130-

50.
8. See infra Tables 1 and 2.
9. The defense of "frolic" is still used in worker's compensation, military law
(primarily duty, temporary duty, and travel cases) and general liability law
cases. For illustrative cases, see infra text accompanying notes 102-113.
10. Joel, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1338-1339.
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employer or agent?" (2) The physical "detour" or "departure"
cases use the physical point of departure from the route to deter12
mine when a "frolic" ends.
3
The respondeat superior rule has been roundly criticized.'
The justifications for such vicarious liability vary. One theory is
that satisfaction coming from a deep pocket is an understandable
policy reason for vicarious liability. Others believe that the rule
has its basis in revenge. One scholar attempted to track the doc4. Ultitrine back to the Roman law doctrine of paterfamilias1
mately, most respected scholars support the finding that
respondeat superior had its genesis in a 1698 decision by Justice
15
Holt.
In 1923, one distinguished author, Young B. Smith, recommended an "enterprise test" of vicarious liability in an attempt to
reconcile the conflicting cases and provide a sound theoretical
underpinnings.' 6 This enterprise test asks: (1) whether the conduct of the master's business was a contributing factor of the servant's act; if not, the master is not liable; and (2) if so, the next
question is whether, in view of what the servant was employed to
do, it was probable that "he would do what he did," instead of
inquiring into the servant's immediate motive in doing the act or
considering whether the particular act, when separated from its
setting, was an act done in furtherance of the particular work
7
which is the focus of the alternative intent test. "
Using an analogy to worker's compensation, Smith further
declared that "it would seem desirable to impose liability upon the
master in every case where the loss may fairly be regarded as an
11. Salome v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 151 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1926); Herr v. Simplex
Paper Box Corp., 198 A. 309 (Pa. 1938); Pratt v. Duck, 191 S.W.2d 562 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 1945);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 235 (1958); see generally W.
PAGE KEETON et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 70 (Keeton

5th ed. 1994).
12. Skapura v. Cleveland Elec. Co., 100 N.E.2d 700 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951);
McCauley v. Steward, 164 P.2d 465 (Ariz. 1945); Lemarier v. A. Towle Co., 52
A.2d 42 (N.H. 1947); Note, Administrationof Risk Through Ohio's Application of
the Frolic and Detour Test, 21 U. CiN. L. REV. 156 (1952). See also KEETON,
supra note 11, at 503-504.
13. Young B. Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 443, 452 (1923).
14. Defined as "the father of a family." BLACieS LAw DICTIONARY 1126 (6th ed.
1990). OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 267 (1963).
15. Smith, supra note 13, at 453. See also James Fleming, Jr., Vicarious
Liability, 28 TUL.L. REV. 161, 165 (1954).
16. Smith, supra note 12, at 444 & 716.
17. Id.
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incident to carrying on the particular enterprise.""8 His justifications for making the master liable for his servant's unauthorized
torts was the desire to include, in the costs of operation, inevitable
losses, such as those to third persons, incident to carrying on an
enterprise. Thus the burden would be distributed among those
benefitted by the enterprise. Hence, the enterprise theory of vicarious liability was born.
Some saw a strong analogy between respondeat superior and
worker's compensation. In one passage, Smith emphasized the
similarities as follows:
If it is socially expedient to spread and distribute throughout the
community the inevitable losses occasioned by injuries to employees engaged in industry, is it not also socially expedient to spread
and distribute the losses due to injuries to third persons which are
equally inevitable? Surprising as it may seem, by means of the
doctrine of respondeat superior the common law has partially
accomplished in the latter case what workmen's compensation
statutes have established in the former. [footnotes omitted.] 9
Some differences between respondeat superior and the compensation acts were also noted, in part, as follows:
It is not denied that there are substantial differences between
compensation acts and the common law doctrine of respondeat
superior. The former are more frequently limited in their application to certain industries, whereas the latter applies to all servants. Furthermore, the compensation acts make the employer an
insurer against injuries to his employees accidentally caused,
whereas respondeatsuperiormakes the master liable to third persons only when the servant is at fault. Moreover, the compensation acts have abolished the defence of contributory negligence,
while contributory negligence will prevent a third person from
recovering from the master. If the justification of the two be the
same, why these differences? The answer would seem to be found
in the way in which the two schemes came about. [footnotes
omitted.]20
Interestingly, one of the developments of the past seven
decades has been the advent of comparative negligence laws
which have further reduced the differences between respondeat
superior liability and worker's compensation. Moreover, Smith
asks whether it would be more scientific to require an employer to
18. Id. at 718.
19. Id. at 457.

20. Id. at 458.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1996
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carry liability insurance on a mandatory basis.2 1 Legal requirements that certain parties carry liability insurance have also been
enacted.2 2
Smith did explore the limits of this social policy justification
for respondeat superior. One of the limits to a policy of liability
insurance is that it would require including in the costs of productions costs which are not a direct result of such production. Such
liability insurance would add to the cost of production the premiums, paid by the employer, for insurance against an employee's
negligent actions which are not related to the employer's enterprise. This is not only bad economic policy, but there is currently
no mechanism for insuring against such losses and liabilities.23
Smith also examined the scope of employment limitation,
starting with the proposition that the servant who is employed to
do a particular work, such as drive a car, cannot be said to be
employed only to drive the car properly.2 4 If such a narrow scope
were given, the servant would not generate liability for the master
if he were driving the car improperly even though the servant
would actually be engaged in doing the very things for which he
had been employed. This narrow definition of the scope of employment would defeat the purpose of the rule of respondeat superior.25 The refusal to unreasonably restrict the scope of
employment results in a basic problem for frolic and detour: if the
master is not responsible for his servant's conduct where the servant's objective is not connected with the business but, the master
is responsible for the servant's conduct where the servant is disobedient in achieving a business objective, what shall the law do
when the servant has two or more objectives only one of which is
connected to the master's business? One suggestion is that the
21. Id. at 458 n.43.
22. See Devine and Manelbaum, Standby LICs for Environmental SelfIndemnification, J. CoM. BANK LENDING, Dec. 1989, at 55-63.
23. Smith, supra note 13, at 461.
24. Id. at 721, The Michigan Supreme Court made the same point more
forcefully as follows:
'Course of employment' is not a sterile form of words. It is descriptive of
life in the industrial age. These human deviations from he course of the
automaton do not suspend the employer-employee relationship. They
are not departures from employment, but the very substance of it.
Crilly v. Ballou, 91 N.W.2d 493, 505 (Mich. 1958); see also Geeslin v. Workmen's
Compensation Comm'r, 294 S.E.2d 150, 155 (W. Va. 1982) (citing this proposition
with approval in this case).
25. Smith, supra note 13, at 721.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss1/4
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same two-part analysis also solves the mixed motive problem. 26
Further, it was argued that the master's liability be confined to
deviations of the servant which, in view of what the servant was
employed to do, were probable.2 7 Thus, the concept of "probable
deviation" emerged.28
A more difficult problem involves the situation "where the servant has temporarily abandoned the master's work [frolic] and
later attempts to resume his work for the master. At what point,
29
either in time or in space does the master's liability re-attach?"
This is, indeed, a difficult issue. Courts split on this matter.3 0 As
to this issue, the servant's intent was viewed as marking a better
boundary for liability than the zone of risk theory. Under an
intent standard, the servant was said to be back within the
umbrella of liability when he intended to resume the master's
3
business. '
Under the zone of risk theory, the servant would not come
back under the master's liability umbrella until such time that he
reached a point in a zone wherein his labors would have been consistent with an act of mere deviation had the original act been
such as to have been a detour rather than a frolic.3 2 This probable
conduct theory might be applied in this instance as suggested by
Young B. Smith. Where a driver, for example, goes beyond any
zone in which he was likely to venture, considering his employment and the scope thereof, the employer should not be liable for
any injury to third parties until the driver returns to the foreseeable zone in which he might "wander" within his employment.33
The following observation was also made:
It does not follow that the mere re-entry of the servant into the
zone of risk renders the master responsible for the servant's acts.
Such reentry must be coupled with an4 intention on the servant's
part to resume the master's business.

26. Id. at 721-22.
27. Id. at 724.
28. Id. at 725.
29. Id. at 727.
30. Id. at 727 (citing Riley v. Standard Oil Co., 132 N.E. 97 (N.Y. 1921)).
31. Smith, supra note 13, at 727 (citing Dokweiler v. American Piano Co., 94
Misc. 714, 160 N.Y. Supp. 270 (1916)).
32. Id. at 727 (citing Dokweiler v. American Piano Co., 94 Misc. 714, 160 N.Y
Supp. 270 (1916)).
33. Id. at 728.
34. Id. at 728 n.47.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1996
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Thus, some would adopt the intent theory limited by the zone
of probable deviation. Smith, for instance, endorses the results in
several cases from New York which he analyzes without endorsing
the language of the court or the method by which the result was
reached:
However, if one will turn to the decisions dealing with the liability
of employers to their employees under Workmen's Compensation
statutes, the ideas above expressed will seem common place. The
purpose of this paper has been to point out that the two problems
are fundamentally the same. Once the courts have recognized this
fact, much of the mist of which now surround respondeatsuperior
will disappear; the riddle of 'frolic' and 'detour' will be solved. 5
The initial commentary on this method for resolving the question of when a frolicking servant had returned under the umbrella
of liability appeared the same year as Smith's article.3 6 In this
note by Elizabeth T. Rouse the dominant purpose test was criticized as generating confusion and conflicting decisions in the
jurisdictions which used it. Further, this note asserted a growing
social tendency to shift the loss to the party best able to bear it
even without fault 37 and found the intent plus probable deviation
theory to be most in accord with the modern tendency.3 8 It also
suggested that such an approach best reflected the economic prin39
ciples of respondeat superior.
Rouse went on to characterize its chosen test as "whether the
servant was in the zone of the employment at the time of the accident.4 0 Rouse continued:
...the zone might be defined as the radius in which under all the
circumstances the servant might be expected to go. To render the
master liable the conduct of his business must have been a contributing cause of the servant's act in starting out. The real question, however, would be 'whether in view of what the servant was
actually employed to do it was probable that he would do what he
did.'4 1 [This aspect of the test is much like the enterprise
approach.]
35. Id. at 731.
36. Elizabeth T. Rouse, Note, Deviation and Departure by Servant, 17 Ky.
L.J. 123 (1929).
37. Id. at 126.
38. Id. at 127.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss1/4

8

Wines: Automobile Insurance Policies Build "Write-Away" Around Frolic an
FROLIC AND DETOUR

1996]

The note suggested that at the time a master sends his servant on
business in a vehicle, the master necessarily exposes third parties
to danger both from expressly authorized acts and from such
deviation as a servant would be likely to make under the circumstances. "It is only just that the master pay for injuries occurring
in a radius where it might be contemplated, from the nature of
and of servants in general, that such actions would
employment
2
4

occur."

The intent plus probable deviation concept, as described in
the Kentucky Law Journal, was "broad enough in its scope to
include various tests that had been formerly used."43 To determine probability of deviation, whether the servant was intended
to travel, and the distance he actually went, would all be important.4 4 Moreover, to render the master liable, the servant must
have had the furtherance of his employment in mind in starting
out. 45 In some cases, the extent of his departure is so clearly dis-

proportionate to the distance of the trip as to entirely remove the
servant from the employment. 46 Thus, seen through the eyes of
Elizabeth T. Rouse and the Kentucky Law Journal, the 1923
Columbia Law Review piece may have given rise to the "motivation-deviation" standard47 for determining liability under "frolic
and detour," a standard which blends the dominant purpose test
with the territorial zone of risk test.48
In 1929, William 0. Douglas, later of the United States
Supreme Court and then Sterling Professor of Law at Yale, wrote
a two-part article entitled "Vicarious Liability and Administration
of Risk."4 9 In this article, Douglas attempted to translate the
rules of vicarious liability including "frolic and detour," into
administration of risk concepts. 50 Douglas commenced his article
with five hypothetical cases involving "frolic and detour."5 1 After
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 128-129.
Id. at 127.

47. Id. at 126.
48. Id. at 127.
49. William 0. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38
YALE L.J. 584, 720 (1929). See also WiLLum 0. DOUGLAs, Go EAST YOUNG MAN
163-64 (1974).

50. William 0. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38
YALE L.J. 584, 720 (1929).
51. Id. at 585-604.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1996
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analyzing each of the five cases, he concluded that there was no
logic to any of the well known distinctions between frolic and
detour on an administration of risk approach. 52 Indirectly, Douglas embraced the entrepreneur theory and Smith's economic
rationalization for the frolic and detour rules.5 3
The next article on frolic and detour appeared in the Missouri
Law Review. This comment written by E.C. Curtis stated that
while there is "a tendency to give a plaintiff relief against a large
corporation [in frolic and detour cases, such] recovery would be
denied in similar circumstances against an individual." 5 It cited
Riley v. Standard Oil Co. 56 as evidence of such a trend. The com-

ment criticized the entrepreneur theory as working fairly well
from the standpoint of risk administration in cases involving commercial employers but not being satisfactory when applied to noncommercial employers.57
A 1952 Marquette Law Review note58 analyzed a Wisconsin
Supreme Court case, 59 which employed an intent test to determine liability of a master for the acts of a servant, criticizing a
1950 Ohio case decision, Skapura v. Cleveland Electric Co., 60 that

didn't use this test. The note states that the Wisconsin rule would
lend itself to a wide application and should be preferred over the
rule announced in the Ohio case that would put an employee
6
outside the scope of employment where there is any deviation.
The note concluded by citing the Restatement of Agency rule 62
which holds that if the agent is motivated by a purpose to serve
this master's business to any appreciable extent, the master
should be subject to liability. This rule would, apparently, "give a
result similar to the rules of Wisconsin and Washington."63 The
52. Id. at 593.

53. Id. at 734-35.
54. E.C. Curtis, Comment, Master and Servant - Frolic and Detour, 2 Mo. L.
REV. 351 (1937).

55. Id. at 355.
56. 132 N.E. 97 (N.Y. 1921).
57. Id. at 356.
58. Harold M. Frauendorfer, Note, Agency - Scope of Employment - Effect of
Employee's Deviation from a PrescribedRoute on Liability of Employer, 35 MARQ.
L. REv. 383 (1952).

59. Linden v. City Car Co., 300 N.W. 925 (Wis. 1941).
60. 100 N.E.2d at 700.
61. Frauendorfer, supra note 58, at 384.
RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 236 cmt. b (1933).
63. Frauendorfer, supra note 58, at 385.

62.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol19/iss1/4
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Restatement rule "would seem to be a better rule" than the one
applied in Ohio.64
In the same year, Skapura was criticized in the University of
CincinnatiLaw Review. 65 In Skapura, the defendant was a public
utility serving customers in the Cleveland area and employed
sixty-three (63) people for the purpose of meter reading alone.66
Except for meter readers assigned to distant areas, all readers
were directed to use public transportation.6 7 Five automobiles
were provided for distant meter readers, and those readers were
instructed to proceed by the most direct route to their respective
areas.6" Each driver was to transport one other designated reader
to an adjacent area but was not to give rides to anyone else.69 One
particular meter reader, who was provided with an automobile,
was assigned to an area which could be reached by traveling a
main boulevard. 70 However, instead of proceeding out the
boulevard, the meter reader deviated and picked up other meter
readers in violation of company rules. 71 He then returned to the

boulevard and proceeded along a direct route several miles to a
place where he stopped and had breakfast with the other meter
readers. 72 Then, instead of continuing on the boulevard, the
driver turned south and drove two miles to a point where he
dropped off the unauthorized passengers.7 3 As he proceeded to
return in the direction of the boulevard, the driver negligently ran
74
into the plaintiff.
On the appeal of the verdict in favor of the plaintiff against
the public utility, the appellate court reversed and entered final
judgment for the utility citing with approval the general rule in
Ohio as follows:
The owner of an automobile is not liable for injuries to a... third
person caused by the negligence of an employee in the operation of
the automobile, unless it is proven that the employee, at the time
64. Id.
65. Note, Administration of Risks Through Ohio's Application of the Frolic
and Detour Test, 21 U. CIN. L.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

REV.

156 (1952).

Id. at 159.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

73. Id.

74. Id.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1996
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was engaged on his employer's business and was acting within the
scope of his employment.7 5
The plaintiff contended that the meter reader's digression furthered company business since he transported three of its employees to their work areas.7 6 The court stated that there was no
evidence to show how such activities benefited the defendant, and
it could be inferred that the digression was for the accommodation
of the driver's friends and for their social convenience.7 7 The
appellate court further ruled on the above facts that it was so
clear that the servant was not operating the automobile on his
master's business or within the scope of his employment that it
was reversible error for the trial court to permit the case to go to a
78

jury.

Malcom summarized in the University of Cincinnati Law
Review the "zone of risk" test by saying that it involved a case-bycase determination. 79 Further, the time of the accident and the
extent of the servant's deviation are important factors for defining
the zone.8 0 It is more probable that a deviation of one mile will
result from an assigned drive of 10 miles then from a drive of 10
blocks."' "It [is] a question of fact for the jury in each case
whether in view of all the facts and circumstances the accident
occurred where the master might reasonably expect to find the
8 2
particular servant, that is, within the 'zone of risk."
Although Malcom found the "zone of risk" test to be the better
rule, he also approved of the "motivation-deviation" test which
applied in most jurisdictions in 1952.83 Under the motivationdeviation test the employee is under the master's liability
umbrella if:
1) in doing the act from which the tort resulted he was motivated
in part at least by the desire to serve his employer;
75. Skapura v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 100 N.E.2d 700, 701 (1951)
(quoting White Oak Coal Co. v. Rivoux, 102 N.E. 302 (Ohio 1913)).
76. Note, Administration of Risks Through Ohio's Application of the Frolic
and Detour Test, 21 U. CiN. L. REv. 156, 159-60 (1952).

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 171.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 171-72.
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2) it further appears that the act from which the tort results was
not an extreme
deviation from the normal conduct of such
84
employees.
Using either of these two approaches, "zone of risk" or "motivation-deviation," better allocates any risk of loss due to the general
hazards of business, taxing the cost to the public as a whole rather
than to individual injured parties; thus the courts could use either
test to better administer the inherent risks of doing business by
the use of agents.8s
In 1954, the Tulane Law Review included a major article by
Fleming James, Jr., Lafayette S. Foster Professor of Law at Yale
Law School.8" Professor James traced the origins and history of
the doctrine of vicarious liability and then turned to the problem
of "frolic and detour." Between the two extreme but clear cases,
one in which a slight detour does not interrupt the master's liability and the second in which a complete abdication of the pursuit of
the master's business absolves the master of liability, James finds
the "greatest confusion and contrariety of opinion."8 7 According to
Professor James, the tendency on the part of modern courts has
been to "recognize the importance of a number of factors [while]
attaching to each a weight that varies" under the facts of each
case thereby generating a question for the jury.88 The factors
include the time and place of deviation, its extent with relationship to the assigned route, the motivation of the servant, and
whether the deviation is of the sort normally made by servants on
such assignments.8 9 On the whole, Professor James concludes
that "this approach seems commendable." 90
However, in setting limits to the jury's function, courts need
to keep in mind the basis for vicarious liability, namely, that the
employer should be liable for those faults which may "fairly be
regarded" as risks of his business. 9 1 In urging this, Professor
James found that some holdings involved a weighing of individual
items among the factors at the expense of the underlying principle. Thus, some courts have held that a deviation which "involves
84. Id. at 172.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Fleming James, Jr., Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL. L. REv. 161, 165 (1954).
Id. at 182.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 178.
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a distinct departure from a prescribed route and [was] made to
serve only the servant's personal interest, is a temporary, abanservice even though the deviation is relatively
donment of ...
insignificant and not unusual."9 2 Unfortunately, according to

James, the Restatement of Agency language, the illustrations
given, and the reporter's notes all suggest that such a case is not
meant to be covered by respondeat superior.93
Professor James also raises the difficult question of when a
servant who has temporarily abandoned his master's service will
be held to have reentered it for purposes of attaching liability to
the master. 94 The analysis of the cases leads him to believe that
most courts have required both an intent to reenter service and
some concrete conduct that brings the servant again "within the
flexible limits of his employment, as to time and space." 95 Also
discussed are acts which, while not involving physical deviation
from an assigned task, are done on the job but are in no way
intended to further the assignment. 96 Typical of such activities is
smoking, with its attendant fire hazards.9 7
On the smoking cases, there are at least three approaches to
imputing negligence to the employer. 98 First, all courts would
hold the employer liable if he permitted smoking or failed to take
reasonable steps to prevent it on jobs where smoking was unreasonably dangerous. 99 Some courts are unwilling to go beyond that
and regard smoking as outside the scope of employment. 10 Second, there is a line of cases which hold that an employer or master
is liable if smoking makes negligent the manner of performing an
act which is within the scope of employment. 101 Professor James
criticizes that rule as leading to capricious results such as the case
of Kelly v. Louisiana Oil Refining Co.' 0 2 In Kelly, the driver of a

gasoline truck went into a cotton broker's place of business to telephone his employer.10 3 While there, the driver lit a cigarette and
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 182.
at 182-83.
at 184.
at 185.

97. Id.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 185-86.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 188.
661 S.W.2d 997 (Tenn. 1934).
Id.
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tossed the match into loose lint cotton. 10 4 The employer was held
not liable although the Tennessee court suggested the result
would have been otherwise had10 the
driver tossed the match into
5
the gasoline he was delivering.

The third and broader view is suggested by a 1950 California
case 10 6 which framed the issue in terms of whether the injury was
one of the "risks of enterprise." 107 Since the presence of employees
on the job was attended by the smoking risk, such a risk was held
there to be one of the risks arising out of employment.' 0 The
smoking or the manner of it on the employee's part must be negligent in the first place to create any liability at all to anyone.' 0 9
Such a result is entirely consistent with economic principles of
vicarious liability. This last approach may not be as viable in
1993 as it was 30 years earlier due to the decline of smoking
among the U.S. public generally" 0 and the increasing public disapproval of smoking"' which has been boosted by increasing
2
awareness of health hazards associated with smoking."
Professor James finds "the most troublesome case" to be the
one where the master's affairs are not being furthered but where
the servant deliberately injures a plaintiff in a quarrel that does
arise out of the employment."' Thus, hypothetically, a truck
driver collides with an automobile and in the altercation which
occasionally follows an accident, the driver loses her temper and
strikes the plaintiff." 4 Or, as an additional hypothetical, a restaurant counterman is angered by insults over a sandwich, and he
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id. (as quoted in James, supra note 87, at 185).
George v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 205 P.2d 1037 (Cal. 1949).
James, supra note 86, at 185 (quoting George, 205 P.2d at 1037).
Id.
Id. at 186 n.99.
National Center for Health Statistics, Healthy People 2000 Review,

Health, United States, 1992: Hyattsville, Maryland: Public Health Service, 140141 (1993).

111. WiLLAmD G.

MANNING et al., THE COSTS OF POOR HEALTH HABITS, A RAND
62-85 (Harvard University Press 1991).
112. Id. See also a study by James Ryan of the Harvard School of Public
Health quoted in, THE EMPLOYMENT GUIDE, at 14 (Washington D.C.: Bureau of
National Affairs 1992), wherein results indicate smokers have a 2.9% excess risk
of occupational accidents, a 4.0% excess risk of injury on the job and a 3.4%
higher absentee rate as compared to nonsmokers.
113. James, supra note 86, at 192.
STUDY,

114. Id.
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strikes a customer.1 1 5 The majority of courts do not allow recovery
in these cases except on much narrower grounds such as non-delegable duties or negligence in employing a person known to be hottempered. 11 6 There was a then recent California Supreme Court
opinion (1949) in which arguments for permitting recovery were
made along the line of worker's compensation cases holding that
to workers arise in the course of their
similar injuries
117
employment.

Interestingly, in regards to the dangerous instrument doctrine, which creates special agency rules for the operation of dangerous instruments, Professor James makes the following
observation:
Even where there is no such statute [i.e., denying application of
the dangerous instrumentality rule to automobiles], the provisions
of the standard non-commercial automobile liability insurance
policy extend its protection to anyone driving the car with the
insured's consent, thereby making any question of vicarious liability unimportant. 1 "
This passage is intriguing because it raises the possibility that
much of the debate about frolic and detour may have been rendered academic by the provisions in liability insurance policies.
Moreover, it raises the possibility that an anomalous result would
arise in a situation in which "frolic and detour" rules denied liability recovery against the employer to the third party while the
worker's compensation rules allowed the employee to recover
against the employer. It would be anomalous in that case
because, the "frolic and detour" doctrine would hold the accident
to have been outside the employment at the exact time that the
worker's compensation rules held it to be within the scope of
employment and arising out of it.
In 1961, the "zone of risk" approach was criticized based upon
the entrepreneur theory of vicarious liability first publicized in
this country by Young B. Smith and more fully developed by William 0. Douglas.11 9 In a Yale Law Review article, C. Robert Morris investigated the insurance and risk spreading functions of the
zone of risk approach, in an attempt to discover whether such
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 190-91 (citing George, 205 P.2d at 1037).
118. James, supra note 86, at 192.
119. C. Robert Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process - The
Insignificance of Foresight,70 YALE L.J. 554 (1961).
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functions provided a good basis for legal theory. He characterized
the number of articles on the subject as part of a continuing
of
debate arising from Oliver Wendell Holmes' disparagement
120
vicarious liability as contrary to common sense.
Morris lists three main criticisms of what he terms "the
Smith-Ehrenzweig method" for defining the extent of entrepreneur responsibility. 12 First, the method suffers from a mistaken
concept of risk.' 22 Second, it fails to take into account certain
insurance practices dictated by the nature of the risk and principally reflected in actuarial science. 123 Finally, the method is tautological in the sense that a zone of risk approach would have the
law decide which losses should be charged to the entrepreneur by
discovering for what losses he has provided. 124 But the entreprethe law dictates he must bear;
neur provides only for the losses
1 25
thus, the theory is circular.

After an extensive analysis of actuarial methods, risk, and
logic, Morris concludes that there is "real truth" in risk spreading
as a rationale for enterprise liability. 26 But the rule does not provide a sound premise for logical expansion elsewhere and is not
very useful in defining the proper extent of liability. Where other
factors are equal, the rule can point to the desirability of placing
the burden upon a financially solvent institution in preference to a
weak one. It may also stress the importance that the burden be
relatively stable from an actuarial point of view. On the other
hand, some uncertainty or chaos is tolerable; and most judgments
based on enterprise liability are the products of chance. 127 The
entrepreneur can adjust to chance here if the law provides additional chance elements of such a magnitude as those which govern
losses because the total cost would approximate actuarial
prediction. 128

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 554.
at 560.

at 560, 581.
at 599.
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FURTHER CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS

A survey of the case law indicates that contrary, confusing,
and, in some cases, outrageous decisions abound. Perhaps the
classic outrageous case occurred in 1945 in South Carolina.12 9
There, in Carrollet al. v. Beard-Laney, Inc., the Supreme Court of
South Carolina held that a jury question was presented as to
whether the employer was liable for fire damage to plaintiff's
house in a setting in which a drunken gasoline truck driver
decided after only unloading one-third of his cargo to return to
duty via another town in order to see a girlfriend. 13 0 When pur13

sued by police, he was last observed speeding to avoid capture. '
The gasoline truck overturned in the town in which the girlfriend

lived and set fire to plaintiffs house.'3 2 The Supreme Court of
South Carolina characterized this as a dual motive case.' 3 3 Our
policy question here is whether any version of enterprise liability
theory might give rise to that result.
In McKinley v. Rawls,134 the Fourth Circuit held that the
question of whether a tire serviceman, who had left his employer's
place of business at noon to make a delivery in the company's
truck, and who is involved in a collision with an automobile about
two hours later after he had allegedly gone home for lunch in a
direction away from the place of delivery but before he had delivered tires, had deviated from his employment presented a question for the jury. The Supreme Court of Alaska held that an
insurance salesman attending a three-day sales conference who
had left the conference seeking out-of-state guests with whom to
socialize and who, upon failing to find any guests, had been
involved in an accident returning to the conference site would generate liability for his employer.'
Both of these cases seem to be
consistent with the enterprise theory of liability expounded by
Dean Smith.
In Ryan v. Western Pacific Insurance, Co.,136 the Oregon
Supreme Court, en banc, addressed the question of liability of an
employer's insurer for injuries arising out of an accident in which
129. Carroll v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 35 S.E.2d 425 (S.C. 1945).
130. Id.

131. Id.
132. Id.

133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
333 F.2d 198 (4th Cir. 1964).
Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133 (Alaska 1972).
408 P.2d 84 (Or. 1965).
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the employee was driving the employer's truck at approximately
1:45 a.m. near a club in Portland where the employee had eaten
and, perhaps, drank following the use of the truck for moving his
household goods. The court affirmed a lower court's decision
against the insurance company on the grounds that the employee
was a permissive user. They rejected the minor deviation rule.
Instead the court stated that at the time of the accident, the
employee was still driving for a personal use, although a different
personal use than that contemplated by the supervisor giving permission. The time and place the accident occurred were within
the general permission granted and as such the employee was a
permissive user for purposes of the automobile insurance policy.
The court emphasized, using the following language, the confusing nature of the problem in this area:
However, here, the problem is not whether Sinovic was acting
within the scope of his employment; the problem [was] whether
Sinovic, who was held individually liable to [the] plaintiff, is
insured individually as a permissive user under Tum-A-Lum's policy. The scope of employment problem is mentioned only because
of sometime confusion with the problem at hand.1 3 7
This passage emphasizes the type of problem first highlighted in
1954 by Professor James' article.
In 1980 the Supreme Court of Wyoming held in Beard v.
Brown there was no question for a jury of whether an employee
was within the scope of her employment when an automobile collision occurred while she was driving home from work during paid
travel time. 138 In that case the court decided that since reasonable minds could not differ as to whether the employee's trip home
was within the scope of employment the court could decide the
13 9
case as a matter of law.
Even though that result might be defensible had it been
returned by a jury, it is hard to understand how the result must be
reached as a matter of law. Moreover, there is some reason to
believe that the employee driver might be entitled to recover
worker's compensation for the injuries she received in the accident
even though the third party plaintiff would be denied recovery
from the employer. Such a result seems somewhat anomalous.
In Anderson v. Sam Monday Motors, Justice Brock writing for
the Tennessee Supreme Court held that an injury to an employee
137. Id. at 85 [emphasis added].
138. 616 P.2d 726 (Wyo. 1980).
139. Id. at 735 (citing Miller v. Reiman-Wuerth Co., 598 P.2d 20 (Wyo. 1979)).
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which occurred when the employee had stopped on his way home
to purchase milk for home consumption arose out of and in the
course of employment where the employer provided the employee
with a demonstrator automobile for his personal use as a form of
advertisement. 4 0 The court also ruled that stopping to purchase
milk did not constitute a "frolic and detour" or deviation so as to
take the injury outside the worker's compensation law coverage as
follows:
Considering the fact that this employer had never laid down
any hard and fast rules to be followed by the plaintiff-employee in
the use of the demonstrator automobile and particularly had not
designated any particular route that he was required to travel
between his work and his home, in our opinion, no deviation had

occurred at the time of this accident. The employee was still in
route [sic] from his place of work to his home. Merely stopping
along the way to purchase a gallon of milk for his home consumption did not constitute a "frolic and detour" or a "deviation." [citation omitted] Such stops along the route between the employer's
place of business and the plaintiffs home had not been forbidden
to him.
Here, the employer chose to furnish the employee with an
automobile for the purpose of providing transportation between
his place of work and his residence, thereby extending the protection of the Worker's Compensation Laws to that journey .... The
law does not prevent the parties from thus extending the protection of the Worker's Compensation Law. Moreover, if the
employer had intended to do so, it was free to designate a hard
and fast rule with respect to the employee's choice of routes
between his work and his home; but it did not do so. [emphasis

added] 4 '
Intriguingly, the court applied "frolic and detour" rules to
determine whether or not the worker's compensation law of Tennessee applied. The court then emphasized that the employer had

done nothing to forbid a shopping trip on the way home, and thus
the employer should be satisfied to have coverage upheld under
the worker's compensation laws.
Courts have continued to be reluctant to impose respondeat
superior liability on employers when the employee engages in
intentional activities which do not further the business of the

140. 619 S.W.2d 382 (Tenn. 1981).
141. Id. at 383.
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employer. 142 But dual purpose cases, with their inherent
problems, have continued to generate liability for employers even
including the U.S. government under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. 143
The reason to attempt to avoid litigation in the frolic and
detour arena is the great uncertainty involved in predicting case
results. For example, there are some strikingly disparate results
in cases involving military personnel under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. In Coonerv. United States,'" the Fourth Circuit held
that an Army officer who was proceeding from one duty station to
another on orders, driving by a direct route, and authorized to
drive his privately owned automobile on a reimbursed basis on
travel status could generate liability for the U.S. government as a
result of an automobile collision in New York. The Fourth Circuit
held the U.S. government subject to liability even though the U.S.
Army could not have ordered the use of the private vehicle, and
the officer's normal Army duties did not include driving
14 5
vehicles.
Contrast that result with McSwain v. United States where
the Third Circuit held that the U.S. government had no liability
for an automobile accident which arose in Colorado as a result of
negligent driving by a Marine Corps corporal en route from Camp
Pendleton, California to Memphis, Tennessee with leave days, as
well as travel time en route. 1 4 6 The court there emphasized the
physical location of the accident 300 miles north of the direct route
from Camp Pendleton to Memphis. This geographical deviation,
in conjunction with the availability of leave days, was held to be
14 7
substantial, geographically.
An exceptionally liberal case under the Federal Tort Claims
Act involving military personnel, Williams v. United States held
that a jury question was presented where an infantry sergeant
carelessly failed to return field simulator explosive devices to the
supply sergeant and left them in a cigar box in a drawer in his
home. 1 48 Several months later, the sergeant was overseas, and
142. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. Reddick, 398 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
District Certified TV Service v. Neary, 350 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
143. See Erwin v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 693 (W.D. Okla. 1969).
144. 276 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1960).
145. Id.
146. 422 F.2d 1086 (3rd Cir. 1970).
147. Id.
148. 352 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1965).
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his wife gave the simulators, which resembled M-80 firecrackers,
to a babysitter. The babysitter took the simulators home and
ignited the fuse on one of them carrying it to the door with the
intent of throwing it outside to see it explode. Before he could
throw it, the simulator went off in the 13-year old boy's hands;
causing severe injuries which were the basis of the federal action.
The Fifth Circuit held that it was conceivable in law that a wife of
a soldier might fail to recognize the dangerous potential of such
simulator devices and fail to take due care to the point of giving
the devices away to a 13-year old boy. 149
A

BRIEF EXAMINATION OF PERMISSIVE USER CLAUSES

The standard language of a permissive user clause, one example of an "omnibus clause" as it is sometimes called, is that the
insurer agrees to provide liability coverage to "the named insured
and any resident of the same household and any other person
using such automobile with the permission of the named insured
• . ."1O Even though this clause has generated some interesting

litigation, it entirely evades the common law issue of agency and
the ensuing issue of frolic and detour by not focusing, as older policies did, on indemnifying the named insured against liability that
he might be "legally obligated to pay" as a result of the operation
51
of the insured vehicle.

Some states have mandated use of permissive user language
under so-called "financial responsibility" laws while others have
mandated such language under insurance statutes and regulations.1 2 As one leading encyclopedic authority asserts, the result
has been that "ordinarily, an automobile policy will cover liability
for injury to a third person arising from the negligent operation
of
5 3
the vehicle by the insured's servant."[citations omitted]
149. Id. at 481.
150. ROBERT E.
FUNDAMENTAL

KEETON AND ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO
PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES

(Practitioner's Ed.) 1211 (West Co. 1988).
151. ROBERT E. KEETON,INSURANCE LAw: BASIC TExT 662, app. H (1971).
152. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1101, 28-1170(B)(1,2) (1995); see
also IDAHO CODE §§ 41-202, 41-203, 41-1812, and 41-1814 (1994) (under which
the Director of the State Department of Insurance is granted authority to
approve or disapprove provisions in all standard contracts of insurance issued in
the State of Idaho).
153. See, e.g., cases collected by APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw AND PRACTICE in
Pub. 6C, Deviation from Permission Granted § 4368 (Buckley ed. 1979).
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The intent to provide coverage and avoid the squabbles over
coverage can be found in some judicial opinions that declare a presumption in favor of coverage.1 5 4 Some litigation has been generated under the permissive user language that is unique to it such
as the question of whether lawful possession is synonomous with
permission 15 and whether a vehicle permitee has authority to
delegate someone else a permitee so as to require coverage of that
person's driving.15 6 One commentator has described the public
policy of New Jersey that favors coverage as a "come hell or high
water" presumption of coverage.157 To the author, the result is a
far cry from the kind of case-by-case determinations under
agency's troublesome frolic and detour concept and seems to represent significant progress in the law.
EmPnuCAL EVALUATION

For many years, automobile accident cases were the leading
contributor to cases in the frolic and detour area.15 8 If the "permissive user" language in automobile insurance policies has effectively avoided litigation then we can expect to see a significant
decline in the frolic and detour cases as a percentage of agency
cases. In view of the large increase in total reported cases since
1926, we believe that the absolute number of "frolic and detour"
cases might grow while at the same time becoming less significant
when measured against the total number of cases involving issues
5 9
of agency. Actual numbers of cases are not readily available.1
154. APPLEMAN, supra note 154, at § 4371 (where the editors state "[alithough
there is generally considered to be a presumption that use made of the
automobile by a person other than the owner is with such owner's consent

[citations omitted], the plaintiff bears the burden of proof to show that
permission actually existed under the facts and circumstances of the case"
[citations omitted]).

155. See Caison v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 36 N.C. App. 173, 243 S.E.2d 429,
appeal after remand, 45 N.C. App. 30, 262 S.E.2d 296 (1978) (in which "lawful
possession" of an automobile and "permission" to operate under the automobile
insurance policy were held to be different standards, not synonomous).
156. See generally APPLEMAN, supra note 154, § 4361 and decisions cited
therein.
157. See ApiPLEmAN, supra note 154 (citing Motor Club Fire and Cas. Co. v.
New Jersey Mfrs. Insur. Co., 375 A.2d 639 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923
(1977)); but see Nicholas v. Sugar Lo Co., 471 A.2d 44, 48 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div.
1983).

158. Sykes, supra note 3, at 583.
159. Telephone conversations with various representatives of West Publishing
Company (Feb. 2, 1989).
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Consequently, we used the number of pages as a proxy for the
number of cases. We soon discovered a problem with our chosen
proxy. In Digest IV (1927-36) and Digest V (1937-46), West Publishing used a two (2) column format; after 1946, West changed to
a three (3) column format. In order to have comparable data, we
modified the page data for Digests IV and V to reflect the number
of pages those digests would have contained had they been prepared in a three (3) column format. Note the relative occurrence
ratio remains constant since both the numerator and denominator
are reduced proportionately, i.e. two-thirds. 160 See the data in
Table 1 unadjusted and in Table 2 as modified to achieve
comparability.
TABLE

1. AcTuAL PAGES
(D)

(A)
Digest
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
ViII.
IX.

(B)
Year

(C)
Total Pages

Pages of
302(1)

1927-36
1937-46
1947-56
1957-66
1967-76
1977-86

53,327
105,204
53,334
55,106
78,329
115,021

9.2
15.25
8.33
7
8
10.75

(D)/(C)
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.

000
000
000
000
000
000

173
145
156
127
102
093

1927-36
Base
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.

000
000
000
000
000
000

Relative
Occurance

173
173
173
173
173
173

100%
84%
91%
74%
59%
54%

Source: lV-IX Decennial Editions of the American Digest (West Publ. Co., St. Paul, MN).

In order to get a basis for visual comparison, we developed bar
graphs to show the number of actual pages in the topic of Master
and Servant for the Decennial Digests since 1927 (See Graph 1)
and then modified the data to adjust for the lack of a third column
in Digests IV and V (See Graph 2). Note that in Graph 2, after
modification, the bar graphs - with a jump in Digest V during
World War II years - reflect a steady growth in litigation and
reported cases.
Following the same line of development, we counted and
graphed the actual number of pages in the Decennial Digest
devoted to key number 302(1), scope of employment generally.
(See Graph 3) Next, we modified the data to reflect comparable
columns per page. (See Graph 4)

160. To illustrate: Suppose we make a ratio of 120:90 reducing both sides by
two-thirds leaves the basic relation unchanged: 40:30. See generally FREDERICK
A.

EKBLAD,

THE

STATISTICAL METHOD

PROBABILITY AND INFERENCE TO
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TABLE

2.

ADJUSTED PAGES
(D)

(A)
Digest

(B)
Year

(C)
Total Pages

IV.

1927-36

V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.

1937-46
1947-56
1957-66
1967-76
1977-86

Pages of
302(1)

(D)f(C)

1927-36
Base

Relative
Occurance

35,550

6.13

0. 000 172

0. 000 172

100%

70,136
53,334
55,106
78,329
115,021

10.17
8.33
7
8
10.75

0.
0.
0.
0.
0.

0.
0.
0.
0.
0.

000
000
000
000
000

145
156
127
102
093

000
000
000
000
000

172
172
172
172
172

84%
91%
74%
59%
54%

Source: IV-IX Decennial Editions of the American Digest (West Publ. Co., St. Paul, MN).

Note that in Graph 4, we find the number of pages from 1927 to
1986 devoted to key number 302(1) to be fairly constant. Now, we
set the ratio of 302(1) pages to Master and Servant pages in Digest
GRAPH 1. ABSOLUTE GROWTH IN PAGES
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IV equal to 100 and generated a comparison with the ratios for
subsequent digests. (See Graph 5.) Note the almost steady
decline in the proportion of Master and Servant cases devoted to
the issue of scope of employment. This decline suggests some success in avoiding frolic and detour litigation under automobile
insurance policies. If the "riddle of frolic and detour" has not been
solved, the insurance companies seem to have found a way to
avoid some of the litigation costs historically associated with it.
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The avoidance 6 ' of a difficult problem may be the next best thing
to solving it.
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

My review of the literature and of the recent cases convinces
me that Young B. Smith's article, which is 65 years old, still has
currency and should not be "retired." The application of a consistent underlying policy would tend to reduce the number of contrary and conflicting opinions in this area. Moreover, the parallel
to worker's compensation laws is still attractive. There is the possibility for a new inquiry in this regard, to wit, whether the scope
of the enterprise should be uniform and not dependent upon
whether a third party seeking liability from the enterprise or
whether the employee is seeking liability. There is also reason to
be concerned that courts are looking either to insurance provisions
to determine liability coverage in automobile cases or looking
exclusively to frolic and detour rules to determine insurance
coverage.
At an initial, abstract level, perhaps liability coverage should
be read as requiring first some liability through standard agency
principles for an employer and secondly within such a context the
use of permissive user clauses. The results of such an approach
161. Not in the sense the term is used to describe appellate courts by KARL N.
LLEwELLYN, Thn COMMON LAW TRADITION 84-86 (Rev. ed., Yale Univ. Press

1977).
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would be to render the permissive user question one of a qualifier
for the underlying liability issue. Additionally, there is some
attraction to having worker's compensation questions produce at
GRAPH 4.
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least compatible answers with the same inquiry raised on a frolic
and detour basis. From my readings, the courts are a long way
from such a result.
In conclusion, it seems that Young B. Smith was quite premature in asserting in 1923 that a simple reference to the worker's
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62
compensation laws would "solve the riddle" of frolic and detour.1
It also appears that Fleming James would be as accurate today as
he was in 1954 in ascribing the "greatest confusion and contrariety" to the "frolic and detour" cases. 163 Someone once said that "if
you can think about something that is related to something else
without thinking about the thing to which it is related, then you
have a legal mind.16 4 Apparently, the courts which have been
wrestling with the issues discussed above have been blessed with
"legal minds." The problem of frolic and detour seems to be no
nearer a logical resolution than it was in 1923. Fortunately, however, the law has made this seemingly insolvable problem much
less significant by substituting the "insurable driver" issue in the
standard automobile liability insurance policy for the problems of
frolic and detour in the law of agency. This apparent bypassing of
the knotty problem of frolic and detour is not in the classic tradition of the common law's evolving to meet society's changing
needs. But the service rendered to the automobile insurance
industry by the underwriter who devised the "permissive user"
concept is in the finest tradition of the bar.

162. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
163. James, supra note 86, at 182.

164. Thomas Reed Powell as quoted in

LON FULLER, THE MoRALrrY OF LAW

4

(Rev. ed. 1964).
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